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no precedents governing the exact question raised in this case. In the absence of statute, it seems to be the rule that a prosperous corporation cannot be dissolved against the protest of a single stockholder. *Kran v. Johnson*, 9 N. J. Eq. 401. COOK ON CORP. Sec. 670 and cases cited.

CORPORATIONS—INSOLVENCY—PREFERENCES TO OFFICERS.—The entire stock of the defendant corporation was owned by the five individuals who composed its board of directors. At the time of the acts in question the corporation was plainly insolvent, with assets about one half the amount of its debts. Some of these debts were owing to the directors. In accordance with an agreement between the directors, A resigned from the board, and B, C and D, (E, the fifth director, not acting), thereupon executed an assignment of all the assets to a trustee, to sell and distribute the proceeds in discharge of claims, in the following order: First, taxes and expenses; second, work and labor, this being a claim of B and C; third, attorney fees; fourth, a note of the corporation to A; fifth, various notes of the corporation upon which C, and D were liable as indorsers. Plaintiff is an unsecured creditor, and as a result of this arrangement nothing remains out of which he may recover his debt. *Held*, that the assignment is invalid. *City National Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co. et al.* (1903), — Ind. App. — 69 N. E. Rep. 206.

This holding is admittedly contrary to the decision in a recent case in the Indiana Supreme Court, *Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid, et al.* (1902), 159 Ind. 614. The present case is transferred to the Supreme Court as provided by statute in such a case. The validity of assignments of insolvent corporations giving preferences, has occasioned much disagreement. *Catlin v. Eagle Bank* (1826), 6 Conn. 233, is a leading case allowing preferences without restriction, and *Wood v. Dummel* (1824), 3 Mason 308, went to the other extreme, and forbade them entirely under the trust-fund theory in regard to assets of insolvent corporations. The weight of modern authority is that preferences to ordinary creditors are valid, but invalid when in favor of directors and officers of the corporation. CLARK AND MARSHALL, CORPORATIONS, section 780 a. A's resignation previous to the assignment is said not to affect her position as an officer. *Mallory v. Kirkpatrick*, 54 N. J. Eq. 50. The trust fund theory has been repudiated in this state. *First Nat. Bank v. Dove-tail Co.*, 143 Ind., 550; *Nathan v. Lee*, 152 Ind. 232; *Henderson v. Indiana Trust Co.*, 143 Ind. 561. The course of judicial decision in Indiana has been to allow great freedom in the making of preferences, even when in favor of officers. *Nathan v. Lee, supra*, and *Henderson v. Indiana Trust Co. supra*, held valid the preference of claim upon which directors were sureties, and in *Levering v. Bimel*, 146 Ind. 545, a direct preference in favor of a director is declared lawful, where his vote was not necessary to authorize it. In *Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid*, 159 Ind. 614, a preference of a claim upon which a majority of directors were sureties, was sustained, and it was broadly stated that "there is no sufficient legal reason why they (directors) should be denied the right of preference in the event that the corporation becomes insolvent." Statutes, either prohibiting or regulating preferences, in such cases, have been enacted in New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Virginia.

EQUITY—JURISDICTION—PARTITION—OIL LEASES.—Thomas P. Zinn was the owner of a tract of oil land. He conveyed to Preston G. Zinn the oil and gas underlying the land, but this conveyance was not recorded. He then conveyed the land to the defendant, Granville F. Zinn, by warranty deed,